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THE CONSTITUTION OUTSIDE THE COURTS
AND THE PURSUIT OF A GOOD SOCIETY
THIN CONSTITUTIONS AND THE GOOD
SOCIETY
Lawrence G. Sager*
The theme of this conference, "The Constitution and the Good
Society," immediately draws one's attention to how little the
Constitution speaks to what makes a good society good-at least if we
are thinking of the judicially-enforced Constitution. Even proponents
of robust, wide-bodied judicial review do not regard most of the
elements of a good society as something that is within the grasp of the
judiciary.
What accounts for this truncation of constitutional concern? For
me, an important element of what we could call the good society
shortfall of constitutional law lies in the distinction between the scope
of the Constitution itself, on the one hand, and the distinctly narrower
scope of the judicially enforced Constitution, on the other. On this
view, our constitutional tradition is best understood as reflecting a
division of labor between the judiciary and other governmental actors,
most notably, but not exclusively, Congress. And on this account, the
Constitution is routinely and properly under-enforced by the
judiciary.'
Affirmative social rights-like those sketched by Professor Robin
West2 and those which dominated the colloquy between Professors
William Forbath and Frank Michelman in the earlier conference
proceedings 3-are prime examples of the sort of constitutional
* Robert B. McKay Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. Lawrence Sager, The Donmain of Constitutional Justice, in Constitutionalism:
Philosophical Foundations 235 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998); Lawrence G. Sager,
Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 410 (1993) [hereinafter Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes]; Lawrence Gene Sager,
Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L
Rev. 1212 (1978).
2. Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society. 69 Fordham L Rev.
1901 (2001).
3. See transcript on file with Fordham Law Review; see also William E. Forbath,
Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 Fordham L
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material that we would expect to elude judicial enforcement. This is
because affirmative rights come wrapped with questions of judgment,
strategy, and responsibility that seem well beyond the reach of courts
in a democracy.
Consider the right to dependent care invoked by Professor West.'4
A society that took this right to heart would immediately face a
plethora of choices. For example, ought the social obligation entailed
by this right be satisfied by the payment of money or by services in
kind? Should it be addressed by government directly or by employers
under the compulsion of government? Which layer of government
should be principally responsible? Who should finance this right?
Should government involve itself in the training or regulation of
caregivers? These are all serious questions that naturally give rise to
Frank Michelman's concerns that the Constitution may take over too
much of the terrain that belongs to democratic government, assuming
rights of this sort came to be judicially recognized and enforced.
It does not follow from this observation, however, that the judiciary
should have no role with regard to social rights. Two cases illustrate a
secondary role that can be (and I believe already is in fact) played by
the judiciary in the protection of such rights. In Goldberg v. Kelly,'
the Supreme Court conferred procedural rights on applicants for basic
welfare grants,6 and thereby reduced the likelihood of arbitrary
exclusions from what could well be seen as an important element of
the right to minimum welfare. In Plyler v. Doe,7 the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional the state's attempt to deprive children of illegal
aliens of the opportunity to attend public schools.8 Plyler also can be
understood as an instance of the Supreme Court protecting the right
to minimum welfare, with the Court patrolling an important element
of that right- education- against unjust categorical exclusions.
When other governmental actors have utterly failed to heed the
mandate of affirmative social rights, it may be that courts are largely
powerless to act. But, when-as may often be the case-the
legislature has responded at least in part to the call of such rights,
courts can play an important secondary role in policing these rights
against arbitrary and unjust exclusions on an individual or group basis.
Further, there may be a substantive, good-behavior-reinforcing
backwash from such secondary judicial activity, especially if the courts
Rev. 1821 (2001); Frank I. Michelman, Democracy-Based Resistance to a
Constitutional Right of Social Citizenship: A Comment on Forbath, 69 Fordham L.
Rev. 1893 (2001).
4. West, supra note 2, at 1924-29.
5. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
6. Id. at 269-71.
7. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
8. Id. at 230.
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become more self-conscious and articulate about the rights that
prompt their involvement.
While these reflections are certainly apt to the theme of the
conference, they also create at least a superficial problem for me. I
have been asked and have agreed to address the connection between
my long-standing ideas regarding judicial underenforcement of the
Constitution9 and Professor Mark Tushnet's provocative arguments in
his recent book, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts.")
Professor Tushnet argues in essence that the entire Constitution
should be outside the reach of the courts' enforcement power. In his
view, the Constitution should be populist in a deep sense; its content
should depend on the shape and degree of the popular support it
enjoys. The problem is this: While I strongly resist the idea that we
would be better served if the judiciary were to abandon the enterprise
of enforcing the Constitution, I do agree that some parts of the
Constitution should be outside the reach of the judiciary. Prime
among those candidates for judicial underenforcement are social
rights of precisely the sort that are the natural focal points in a
conference on "The Constitution and the Good Society." So it seems
at first blush that Professor Tushnet and I have little to disagree
about, at least in these precincts. But I think that there are rather
deep divisions between us, even (and perhaps especially) with regard
to social rights to material well-being. Much of my difficulty with the
ideas in Professor Tushnet's book can be collected around his use of
the metaphor, the "thin" Constitution.12 Although Professor Tushnet
and I have both made use of that metaphor, we have very different
ideas in mind.
For my part, I think the judicially-enforced Constitution is
surprisingly thin in the sense that it seems to fall so far short of
addressing unduckable elements of fundamental political justice; and
further, I think that the best way to understand the thinness of the
judicially-enforced Constitution is to distinguish that particularly
visible manifestation of our constitutional practice from the
Constitution itself.
Professor Tushnet deploys the metaphor of the thin Constitution
quite differently. He sets himself the project of describing a
Constitution so limited in its reach that it becomes plausible to believe
that popular political processes will by and large honor its precepts.,3
A Constitution that can satisfy this conceptual requirement actually
has to be thin; for me, in contrast, the Constitution only looks that
way.
9. See supra note 1.
10. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999).
11. Id at 177-85.
12- See iL at 185.
13. Id at 62-63.
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I think that there is an element of ambiguity-perhaps it would be
more accurate to call it an instability-in Professor Tushnet's version
of the thin Constitution. In the remainder of these remarks, I want to
explore this instability against the backdrop of the sorts of social rights
that come to mind when we contemplate the good society.
The instability in Professor Tushnet's notion of a thin Constitution
lies in the distinction between a constitutional premise being thin at its
normative base and being thin (perhaps short would be better) in its
substantive reach. Consider, for instance, how Professor Tushnet's
thin Constitution sheds its girth. He says: Let's do away with the
body of the Constitution; let's confine ourselves to the Declaration of
Independence and the Preamble; 4 let's do away with things like the
Emolument Clause, (which comes in for a singular amount of
bashing);15 and let's do away with a lot of judicial doctrine, like the
tiers of scrutiny in equal protection. 6 What we have left are just a few
basic values, such as equal citizenship, named in the Declaration of
Independence and in the Preamble, which are values that we all
salute.
But this is a deceptive and highly unstable picture. Although the
basal principles that compose Professor Tushnet's thin Constitution
are few, their substantive scope, if fully realized, would be quite large.
The entailments of these principles are much broader than most
Americans' view of the reach of the present Constitution. Fully
realized, for example, the ideal of equal citizenship in the Preamble
and in the Declaration of Independence surely would include the right
to minimum welfare, entailing an obligation to arrange our economic
affairs so that a person willing to work hard can be assured of the
capacity to provide herself and her family with minimally decent food,
shelter, medical care and education. At times, Professor Tushnet
seems to recognize this. 7
If Professor Tushnet's Constitution is thin in this way (e.g., thin at
its normative base, but extensive in its reach), it is indeed an attractive
Constitution. Under this version of Professor Tushnet's thin
Constitution, however, there surely is no good reason to be confident
that it will be widely accepted and well-served by popular politics.
Conversely, if the Constitution is thin not only in its normative
foundation but drastically limited in its substantive results, there
might in fact be relatively broad support for it among American
citizens. It is far from clear, however, that it would be a satisfactory
Constitution. Indeed, we might have reason to worry that on the basis
of this reading the thin Constitution might just as well not be there at
all. On this reading, a circularity sets in-those things that we can all
14. Id. at 51.
15. Id. at 36.
16. Id. at 60-61.
17. See id. at 169-72.
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readily agree on are what compose the Constitution; so of course we
are not tempted to deviate from its checks on our behavior.
Consider the case study that Professor Tushnet puts on the table at
the beginning and end of his book'-the enactment by popular
initiative of Proposition 187 in California.' 9 Among other things, the
proposition denied children of illegal aliens the right to a public
education. In Plyler v. Doe,' remember, the Supreme Court held that
Texas could not deny children of illegal aliens the benefit of an
ongoing program of free public education.' Proposition 187 set the
people of California squarely against the Supreme Court under
circumstances in which the Court could be understood to insist that it
is fundamentally unjust for an element of minimum welfare, like
education, to be withheld from children who are innocent of
wrongdoing. Whatever one's views of the merits of Plyler, the
enactment of Proposition 187 seems a good test of Professor
Tushnet's thin Constitution.
Professor Tushnet's Constitution seems to wax and wane. Tushnet
rather dramatically fattens his thin Constitution by suggesting that
welfare rights are indeed within the scope of its concerns. 2 But when
his Constitution encounters Proposition 187,1 we suddenly see it in
very thin profile indeed. For Professor Tushnet, the people of
California are free to deprive children of illegal aliens from the
benefits of education, and free to do so on the grounds that they are
not as deserving as more complete members of our political
community. All that the thin Constitution hopes for is that the people
of California have the welfare of the remaining children in mind as
opposed to acting out of pure "nativism," out of a deep animus to the
"other."24
So Professor Tushnet's thin Constitution is broad only in the subtle
and elusive sense that it includes questions of material welfare among
its theoretical concerns, but extremely thin because it does not call for
any particular outcome. What it calls for, at most, are generous
restraints on the express terms of political discourse. It is surprisingly
comfortable with mean-spirited, and quite possibly hypocritical or
self-deceiving, outcomes.
Consider in this regard not just Proposition 187, but California's
legislation that made newly-arrived welfare recipients, during their
first year of residence, entitled to only the welfare benefits of the state
& Id. at 6-7, 193-94.
19. For the Amendments made by Proposition 187, see Cal. Gov't Code §
53069.65 (West 1997); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 130(c) (West Supp. 2001); Cal.
Welf. & Inst. Code § 10001.5(c) (West Supp. 2001).
20. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
21. Id. at 230.
22. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 169-72.




from which they had comeY The current Supreme Court-no overt
fan of welfare rights-famously decided that this legislation violated
the long-forgotten Privileges or Immunities Clause.26  Professor
Tushnet, in contrast, presumably would find California's treatment of
newly-arrived welfare claimants constitutional, so long as the
predicate discourse for the enactment of the legislation did not cross
the line into state-centered "nativism" or reflect a general animus
toward the indigent.
So Professor Tushnet's thin Constitution starts thin at the base,
gestures at a broad substantive reach, but in the end, settles for
restraints at the extreme margins of political debate. We should be
clear that this waxing-and-waning, thin Constitution is merely a
conceptual construct in Professor Tushnet's analysis. It is a palimpsest
of what is so uncontroversial for the American people as to be reliably
respected by them; it doesn't actually constrain or even inspire. The
thin Constitution, essentially, is Professor Tushnet's assurance to us
that we are capable of self-restraint over a narrow terrain.
Even in the realm of social rights, such as the affirmative rights to
material well-being, my thin Constitution and Professor Tushnet's thin
Constitution are very different in concept and consequence. My thin
Constitution, based on underenforcement theory, preserves and
justifies an important secondary judicial role in the enforcement of
social rights. This secondary role is illustrated by the Supreme Court's
decisions in Goldberg,27 Plyler s and for that matter, in Saenz v. Roe,29
where the Court invalidated California's limits on the welfare benefits
of new arrivals to the state. 30 Important and immediate procedural
and substantive consequences can turn on these secondary
enforcement cases. Such cases also offer the constitutional judiciary
the opportunity to provoke dialogue and goad the conscience of the
community with regard to the material welfare of those worst off.
Even when judicial enforcement of the Constitution is completely
out of the picture, and the consequence of attributing a normative
premise to the Constitution resides largely in political dialogue, my
thin Constitution and Professor Tushnet's diverge. Consider two
idealized forms of political conversation. In the first, it is possible to
invoke social rights like the right to minimum welfare and insist that
they are part of our constitutional tradition. In the second, no
substantive rights to material outcomes can be invoked in the name of
the Constitution; the Constitution can be understood only to exclude
certain dark impulses-like the nativistic animus. Now, it may well be
25. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 492 (1999).
26. Id. at 503-04.
27. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
28. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
29. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
30. Id. at 503-04.
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that there is room for both forms of extra-judicial invocation of the
Constitution. It may be that some normative claims properly
assignable to the Constitution should be understood as giving on to
what we could call the strong form of constitutional dialogue, in which
substantive outcomes can be insisted upon, and others should be
understood as giving on to the weak form of constitutional dialogue in
which the Constitution intervenes only to bar certain kinds of
conversation.31
The models even could converge under some circumstances. For
example, if the rules of conversation were sufficiently demanding, and
were actually observed, we might imagine that the idealized
conversation would pick out exactly those fundamental normative
premises that we would otherwise be drawn to as candidates for
assignment to the Constitution. But, as Professor Tushnet's analysis
of the enactment of Proposition 187 by California's voters makes
clear, his thin Constitution requires far less of political dialogue than
that. In sum, my point is this: We should understand the Constitution
as containing some normative premises, albeit judicially
unenforceable, that are categorical, non-negotiable, and demanding of
priority.
I think, for example, that the proposition that we ought to arrange
our economic affairs so that a person willing to work hard will be able
to provide herself and her family with minimum food, shelter,
education, and medical care, is such a premise. There is no space in
Professor Tushnet's thin Constitution for any such view.
Professor Tushnet's claim that the Constitution should do its work
without the benefit of judicial enforcement is perhaps most appealing
when we consider the constitutional embrace of social rights to
material well-being. But, even here, there are grounds to worry that
his Constitution is far too thin. A good society deserves and requires
a thicker Constitution-a better Constitution.
PANEL DISCUSSION
Excerpts of discussion pertaining to Professor Sager.
I would like to respond to Mark Tushnet's very interesting question
about how Constitution-talk differs from justice-talk. This is an issue
for anyone who thinks of the Constitution outside the courts.
31. This possibility was suggested to me by the colloquy earlier in the conference
between Professors William Forbath and Frank Michelman. See supra note 3.
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I cannot imagine a legislator saying she is not concerned with
justice. So this is a very interesting inquiry, especially in light of Bob
Nagel's searing skepticism about how the real world works.32
One point I want to make should be obvious: My interest in
underenforcement is not only because of what it suggests about how
events outside the courts should go, but also because of what it
suggests about how events inside the courts should go. I remain, I'm
afraid, unabashed in my conviction that we are going to do better with
courts in the picture than without.
I have already mentioned one judicial consequence of
underenforcement-some decisions which are not particularly easy to
defend, such as Plyler v. Doe,33 manifest at least a defensible structure
if viewed in the light of underenforcement. Also, if one is attracted to
the governing idea of underenforcement-that there should be a
division of constitutional labor-then some recent decisions of the
Supreme Court seem singularly ill-conceived. The Supreme Court in
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents' and United States v. Morrison,35
for example, ignored the possibility that it ought to welcome, rather
than eschew, a partnership with Congress in achieving the good
society in the name of and under the warrant of the Constitution. As
such, these cases attack the underenforcement theory where it lives.
Conversely, they are distinctly vulnerable to criticism from the
vantage of underenforcement.
Underenforcement does not imply that Congress's authority is
unlimited. I have developed elsewhere the theme that Congress can
only act as the Court's partner, not its adversary. 6 But in neither
Kimel nor Morrison does it seem to me that Congress could plausibly
be considered the Court's adversary. To the contrary, both are
appealing instances of Congress acting as the Court's partner. From
the vantage of underenforcement theory, Congress' Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 5 enforcement authority is understood far
differently than the Court would appear to understand it in these
recent cases.
QUESTION FROM PROFESSOR FRANK MICHELMAN: Did
you have in mind a constitutional norm which is non-negotiable? It
does not just ask us to address our question from the standpoint of a
general aspirational norm of social citizenship for everyone, but it is
32. See e.g., Robert F. Nagel, Nationalized Political Discourse, 69 Fordham L.
Rev. 2057 (2001).
33. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
34. 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
did not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits by private
individuals).
35. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that neither the Commerce Clause nor the
Fourteen Amendment provided Congress with authority to enact the civil remedy
provision of the Violence Against Women Act).
36. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes, supra note 1, at 431.
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actually non-negotiable. If you know how to articulate the norm in
terms such that you can say that it is non-negotiable, why would you
want to take it away from the courts.
PROFESSOR SAGER: Several points in passing on the idea of a
democratic default favoring legislative outcomes. First, there are
important aspects of the judicial process that may make it appealing to
democracy in both form and result.
Second, the democratic default is that it presumes that, ceteris
paribus, democracy is better off if every decision made by a polity is
made by democratically accountable officials. That is never an
intuition that has held a grip on me. I have never thought that if
everything else was equal between England and us, and we did it with
a court and they did it without, that somehow we would be worse off.
That does not seem to get at what democratic values are like. Courts
may be more democratic in some ways. There are thresholds
operating here as to the nature of democratic demands, and not every
instance of a non-accountable decision-maker accrues to the
detriment of democracy.
The third point about the democratic default is that the world is
voting with its feet. Constitutionalism is rapidly becoming the norm,
not the exception in both aspiring democratic states, and settled
states, such as England.
If an entitlement is understood as non-negotiable, in the way that I
would like the right to minimum welfare to be understood, it has been
asked why it is unsuitable for judicial enforcement in the first instance.
The problem is not that the outcomes required by the right to
minimum welfare cannot be suitably specified. The problem is the
various ways of achieving those outcomes are wrapped with questions
of strategy and responsibility that are not properly the courts' business
in a democracy.
One answer might be that the courts could approach this like a civil
rights remedy question. A court could announce that the right to
minimum welfare was not being met, and then insist the various
implicated governmental entities respond with a plan (e.g., "Come
back and tell me whether you've got it right.").
Part of the problem, if you think about the variables here, is what
the "it" is and who the defendant is. Can you hold any given level of
government to be in default? Can you hold the society in default?
There is a real problem here.
When you talk again about attractive claims, like Robin West's
right to dependent assistance, 7 questions arise which are extremely
hard to frame, even if you think that the bottom line is non-
negotiable. The world might well be better off if somehow the courts
could at least clearly pronounce the existence of such constitutional
37. West, supra note 2, at 1924-29.
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obligations, even by way of declaring society to have failed to fulfill
them. I certainly do not mean to suggest that our present moral
imagination and judicial practice marks the exact boundary of the
courts' ideal state of involvement.
